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MAKING A LIFE’S WORK
ROBERTA F. MANN*
Abstract
Jonathan Barry Forman was a thoughtful and prolific scholar. Many of
his policy recommendations bear reexamination in these most turbulent of
times. This Article examines the past and future impact of three works by
Professor Forman: first, his book Making America Work;1 next, the article
we wrote together, Making the IRS Work;2 and finally, the last article we
co-authored, Borrowing from Millennials to Pay Boomers: Can Tax Policy
Create Sustainable Intergenerational Equity?3
In Making America Work, Professor Forman set forth his view of “how
government policies should be changed to both encourage greater work
effort and reduce economic inequality.”4 The book explored the interaction
of government policies and market economic forces, looking at both the
spending side and the revenue side of government action. While the
statistics the book cited are outdated (the book was published in 2006), the
recommendations are still vital, and some of them have been implemented.
In the first part of the Article, I update some of the statistics, highlight the
recommendations that have been implemented, and explore recent
scholarship that expands on some of the other recommendations, such as a
universal basic income.
© 2022 Roberta Frances Mann
* Mr. & Mrs. L. L. Stewart Professor of Business Law, University of Oregon School
of Law; B.S. (Psychology), 1980, Arizona State University; M.B.A., 1982, Arizona State
University; J.D., 1987, Arizona State University; LL.M., 1995, Georgetown University Law
Center. From 1987 to 1997, Professor Mann served in various capacities at the National
Office of the Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief Counsel. In 1997 and 1998, Professor
Mann served on the staff of the Joint Committee of Taxation.
The author is grateful to Jonathan Barry Forman, for his insight, intellect, and
friendship. He is sorely missed. Thanks are also due to Caleb Crahan, University of Oregon
School of Law J.D. 2022, for his expert research assistance. This Article is dedicated to Lani
Malysa, Jon’s devoted wife.
1. JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK (2006) [hereinafter FORMAN,
MAKING AMERICA WORK].
2. Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service
Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725 (2015) [hereinafter Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work].
3. Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Borrowing from Millennials to Pay
Boomers: Can Tax Policy Create Sustainable Intergenerational Equity?, 36 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 799 (2020) [hereinafter Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials].
4. FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at xiii.
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In Making the IRS Work, Professor Forman and I focused on the
problems faced by a resource-constrained Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
and made recommendations for improvement. We considered a variety of
approaches that would make it easier for the IRS to raise and collect
revenue. Our recommendations for legislative and administrative changes
included simplifying the tax system, enhancing third-party reporting, and
streamlining the tax filing and dispute resolution procedures. Many of the
issues we examined persist, and the recommendations are still valid. In
particular, the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”)5
exacerbated many of the problems. In this part of the Article, I explain how
legislative changes and the pandemic have impacted the IRS and how our
recommendations could help solve some of the more recent issues.
In Borrowing from Millennials, Professor Forman and I considered the
intergenerational aspect of the tax system in the United States. Noting that
future taxpayers may be in a different situation than current taxpayers, both
from increasing income and wealth inequality and from the anticipated
increasing burden of government deficits, we considered how to use tax
policy to create sustainable intergenerational equity. We did not limit our
analysis to budget deficits but also considered how inadequate responses to
the challenge of climate change and failing infrastructure may impact future
generations. To update this Article, I explore how the recently enacted
bipartisan infrastructure legislation and the proposed “Build Back Better”
legislation might affect intergenerational equity.
I can think of no better way to honor Professor Forman’s legacy than to
carry it forward. At the time of his death, Professor Forman and I planned
to write an article on how tax policy could facilitate remote work. I now
plan to write that article with one of Professor Forman’s recent co-authors,
Caroline Bruckner. I think we will have to call it Making Work from Home
Work.
I. Making America Work (Again)
Forman observed that
[g]overnments influence the market’s distribution of earnings
and income through regulation, spending, and taxation.
Government regulation defines and limits the range of markets
and so influences the shape of the initial distribution of earnings
and income, and taxes and transfers are the primary tools for
5. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
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achieving redistribution. . . . First and foremost, taxes reduce the
incomes of those who are taxed; . . . at least a portion of the
revenue collected from well-to-do taxpayers is redistributed to
those who are less fortunate.6
It is still true that the federal government “raises virtually all of its
revenue from the individual income tax, Social Security payroll taxes, the
corporate income tax, estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes on selected
goods and services.”7 However, since the book was published, the
proportion of federal revenues raised from the corporate tax and the estate
and gift taxes has declined significantly.8 The TCJA made the most
dramatic changes to the tax system.9 The nominal corporate tax rate was cut
from 35% to 21%, effective in 2018;10 however, as in the past, corporations
have ways of reducing their effective tax rates. In 2006, a taxpayer could
transfer up to $2 million free of federal estate and gift tax, with estates
exceeding that amount taxed at 46%.11 Through some budget gimmickry,
Congress fully eliminated the estate tax in 2010,12 only to revive it in 2011
with an exemption of $5 million, with estates exceeding that amount taxed
at 35%.13 The TCJA increased the exemption to over $11 million, with
estates exceeding that amount taxed at 40%.14
The top individual tax rate increased from 35% in 2006 to 37% in 2018,
although in the interim, the top individual tax rate reached 39.6%.15 An
increase in the standard deduction reduced the number of middle-class
6. FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 57.
7. Id. at 58.
8. Compare id. (reporting an estimated $292 billion in corporate tax collected in 2001),
with Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 810 (reporting $205
billion in corporate tax collected in 2018).
9. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13001.
10. See id.
11. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
521, 115 Stat. 38, 71 (excluding $2 million for estates of decedents dying in 2006); id. § 511
(taxing the excess at 46%).
12. Id. § 501.
13. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (providing a temporary two-year
extension of the estate tax through 2012); see also id. §§ 301–302.
14. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, § 11061 (increasing the exemption from $5
million to $10 million, indexed for inflation); see also Estate Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/estate-tax (Nov. 15, 2021) (noting an exemption
of $12,060,000 in 2022).
15. Historical U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates & Brackets, 1862-2021, TAX
FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/historical-income-tax-rates-brackets/.
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taxpayers benefiting from itemized deductions, making those deductions
primarily a benefit for wealthy taxpayers.
The COVID-19 pandemic that gripped the world in 2020 and 2021 (and
appears to still be gripping the world as I write) spurred some temporary
changes to the tax code that enhanced redistribution—without increasing
revenues, however. Indeed, in 2006, the federal deficit was less than $500
billion.16 A deficit occurs when federal spending exceeds federal revenues.
The excess spending is primarily financed through debt.17 In 2020, the
federal deficit hit over $3 trillion due to COVID relief spending.18
Economists disagree on the impact of deficit spending. What effects do
deficits have on the economy? Some economists promote a classical theory
of deficits:
According to the classical theory of deficits, budget deficits have
the effect of increasing current consumption by government or
consumers, but this is counterbalanced by a fall in investment.
By definition, if consumption rises then savings must fall. A fall
in savings raises interest rates, which then reduces investment.
The phenomenon by which budget deficits increase interest rates
and reduce investment is called crowding out.19
In contrast, economists who follow the Keynesian model (espoused by
John Maynard Keynes) often support deficit spending, especially in times
of recession.20 They argue that, during a recession, the beneficial multiplier
effects of increased spending far outweigh any concerns about crowding
out.21 Politicians also disagree on deficit spending—although their level of
concern varies depending on which party holds Congress and the White

16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 364 (2005).
17. Management’s Discussion & Analysis, BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., https://www.
fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/financial-report/2017/government-financial-positionand-condition.html (June 3, 2019).
18. Jim Zarroli, $3.1 Trillion: Pandemic Spending Drives the Federal Budget Deficit to
a Record, NPR (Oct. 16, 2020, 3:08 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/10/16/924582156/-3-1-trillion-pandemic-spending-drives-the-federal-budgetdeficit-to-a-record.
19. NATHAN PERRY, GLOB. DEV. POL’Y CTR., BOS. UNIV., DEBT & DEFICITS: ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ISSUES: AN ECI TEACHING MODULE ON SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
IN ECONOMICS 9 (2020), https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2020/06/Debt-and-Deficits_Final-1.pdf
(emphasis omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11.
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House.22 The issue of deficits is more fully discussed in the third section of
this Article, when we consider the sustainability of the tax system.
As Forman noted, taxes influence work behavior.23 Economists have
described two countervailing impacts of taxes on work: the substitution
effect and the income effect.24 Under the substitution effect, if taxes reduce
the economic benefit from working, workers might decide to substitute
untaxed leisure.25 Forman wrote, “The bottom line is that high marginal tax
rates on earned income discourage people from working.”26 Forman cited
the work of Edward Prescott, who found that Americans work 50% more
hours than French or Italian workers.27 He concluded that the differences in
work effort were largely attributable to differences in marginal tax rates,
with U.S. marginal tax rates lower than those in Europe.28 Under the
income effect, in contrast to the substitution effect, if taxes reduce the
income required for a person’s needs, that person might work more hours to
obtain the necessary net income.29
Marginal tax rates are not the only tool in the government toolbox that
can affect work behavior. As Forman described, the earned income tax
credit, which as a refundable tax credit serves as a negative income tax,
encourages work.30 Similarly, providing tax credits for childcare also
encourages work.31
As an expert in employment taxes, Forman also addressed some of the
inequities of the payroll tax. The payroll tax applies at a flat rate to earned

22. See Albert Hunt, Republicans Now ‘Shocked, Shocked’ That There’s a Deficit, HILL
(Jan. 27, 2021, 11:30 AM ET), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/536066-republicans-nowshocked-shocked-that-theres-a-deficit.
23. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 70–73.
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id. at 71–72.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id. at 80–81 (“[T]he earned income tax credit has shown itself a great tool for
encouraging work effort and alleviating poverty.”).
31. Linda Smith & Kathlyn McHenry, How Two Tax Policies Help Working Families
Access and Afford Child Care, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 5, 2021), https://bipartisan
policy.org/blog/how-two-tax-policies-help-working-families-access-and-afford-child-care/#
(“[F]amilies frequently struggle with the high cost of care that in turn impacts their ability to
find and keep stable employment . . . .”) (“[H]elping parents afford the high costs of child
care is such a critical component of their path to financial stability . . . .”).
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income up to a cap.32 As such, it has a regressive impact because, in
addition to having higher earned income, wealthier taxpayers have more
income from investments. Effective in 2013, however, Congress enacted a
3.8% Medicare surcharge on net investment income of taxpayers with
adjusted gross income exceeding a threshold amount.33 As the chart in the
next section shows, the revenues from the payroll tax have now exceeded
those of the individual income tax.
A. Statistics
The payroll tax was estimated to be the largest source of government
revenues, with the individual income tax close behind.34 As noted above,
the share of corporate tax and estate tax revenues has declined. Certain
excise tax receipts are also declining—in particular, the gasoline tax
revenues, which are dedicated to the highway trust fund, have declined
because of increased automobile efficiency.35

32. Julia Kagan, Payroll Tax, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/p/payrolltax.asp.
33. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1061 (codified at I.R.C. § 1411).
34. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PUB. NO. JCX-18-21, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2021, at 36 (2021) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PUB. NO.
JCX-18-21]. An updated estimate from Data Lab indicated that the individual income tax
actually produced more revenue in 2021 than the payroll tax. Sources of Revenue for the
Federal Government, DATA LAB, https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/
revenue/categories/ (last visited July 9, 2022) (reporting 51% of revenues from the
individual income tax and 31% from the payroll tax).
35. JOSEPH KILE, DIR. OF MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM
SOLVENCY OF THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/
system/files/2021-04/57110-highway-testimony.pdf.
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Statistics from the Joint Committee on Taxation36

36. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PUB. NO. JCX-18-21, supra note 34, at 34.
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37. Id. at 36.
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Statistics from the Congressional Research Service38
Federal revenues as a share of gross domestic product (“GDP”) have
fluctuated between 15% and 20% since 1950,39 so they have not
significantly changed since the book’s publication.

38. ANTHONY A. CILLUFFO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46938, FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES:
BACKGROUND AND GENERAL ANALYSIS 8 (2021).
39. Briefing Book: Some Background, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-federal-government (May 2020).
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40. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PUB. NO. JCX-18-21, supra note 34, at 35.
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Finally, the table below compares the share of federal tax liabilities and
average tax rates per income quintile in 2018 with the share of federal tax
liabilities and effective tax rates per income quintile in 2003, as reported in
the book.41 Note that average federal tax rates may differ from effective tax
rates, but the Congressional Budget Office has not published effective
individual tax rates since 2005.

Income
Category

Share of
Federal Tax
Liabilities
2003

Share of
Federal Tax
Liabilities
201842

Effective
Federal Tax
Rate 2003

Average
Federal Tax
Rate 2018

Lowest
Quintile

1.0

0.0

4.8

0.0

Second
Quintile

4.5

3.6

9.8

8.1

Third
Quintile

9.9

8.9

13.6

12.8

Fourth
Quintile

18.6

17.5

17.7

16.7

Highest
Quintile

65.7

69.8

25.0

24.4

B. Recommendations
As previously described, some statistics have changed, although
generally following the same trends Forman observed in his book. In this
section, I explore Forman’s recommendations for improving the tax system
to encourage work and note which ones have been accomplished in whole
or in part, which remain unadopted, and which need a bit of updating.

41. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 66.
42. Historical Shares of Federal Tax Liabilities for All Households, TAX POL’Y CTR.
(Sept. 20, 2021), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-shares-federal-taxliabilities-all-households.
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1. Accomplished (Temporarily): EITC and Child Tax Credit
Forman recommended restructuring the earned income tax credit
(“EITC”) as a way of reducing effective marginal tax rates on low-income
workers.43 Forman wrote “[i]f we are serious about increasing the rewards
for low-skilled workers, it would make sense to stop taxing them.”44 The
EITC is “the largest need-tested antipoverty program that provides cash to
families.”45 If a taxpayer’s EITC, as a refundable tax credit, is greater than
what she owes in income taxes, the taxpayer will receive the part of the
credit that exceeds her income tax liability as a tax refund.46 A low-income
taxpayer with no income tax liability will receive the full amount of the
credit as a refund.47 Households receive the EITC once a year as a lumpsum payment after filing their federal income tax returns.48 In particular,
Forman noted that while the EITC benefitted workers with children, many
poor workers without children paid federal taxes:49
Workers with qualifying children . . . receive the majority of
EITC benefits. For 2018, 26.5 million taxpayers received a total
of $64.9 billion from the EITC. Of that total, there were 6.9
million recipients without qualifying children (about 26% of the
total) who received $2.1 billion (about 3% of the total dollars),
receiving an average credit of $302.50
The expansion of the EITC in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
implemented Forman’s recommendation to expand the EITC for childless
workers, although only temporarily. Prior to the enactment of the American
Rescue Plan Act (“ARPA”) for 2021, “the ‘childless’ EITC gradually
phased in at a rate of 7.65% as earned income increased until earned
income reached $7,100.”51 The EITC then remained at $543—its maximum
level—until income equaled $8,880 for unmarried taxpayers or $14,820 for

43. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 129; see I.R.C. § 32
(Earned Income Tax Credit).
44. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 128.
45. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11610, THE “CHILDLESS”
EITC: TEMPORARY EXPANSION FOR 2021 UNDER THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT OF 2021
(ARPA; P.L. 117-2) 1 (2021) [hereinafter CRANDALL-HOLLICK, THE “CHILDLESS” EITC].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 128.
50. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, THE “CHILDLESS” EITC, supra note 45, at 1.
51. Id.
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married taxpayers.52 If the taxpayer’s income exceeded these levels, the
credit would gradually decline until the credit was fully eliminated.53 The
EITC would reach zero for single filers with incomes at $15,980 or higher
and for married filers with incomes at $21,920 or higher.54 Before 2021, a
childless individual could not receive the EITC before age twenty-five or
after age sixty-four.55
For 2021, ARPA
temporarily increase[d] the rate at which the credit phases in,
from 7.65% to 15.3%; nearly triple[d] the maximum amount of
the credit from $543 to $1,502; increase[d] the income level at
which the credit beg[an] to phase out from $8,880 to $11,610
(and from $14,820 to $17,550 if married); and increase[d] the
rate at which the credit phase[d] out from 7.65% to 15.3%.56

Statistics from the Congressional Research Service57
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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Forman also recommended making the child tax credit fully refundable.58
The TCJA increased the child tax credit to $2,000 per child and raised the
phase-out thresholds, effective from 2018 through 2025.59 The credit is
refundable up to $1,400 per child.60 For 2021 only, ARPA increased the
credit and made it fully refundable.61 For 2021, the credit was $3,000 per
child between ages six and seventeen, with an additional $600 for children
under the age of six.62 Unlike most credits, which taxpayers receive as a
lump sum after they file their tax returns, taxpayers received half of their
2021 child tax credit via monthly payments from July through December
2021.63 The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) estimated that the
increases in availability of the expanded child tax credit among the lowestincome families would significantly boost incomes and cause the child
poverty rate to fall by almost half, from 13% to 7%.64 CRS estimated that
the share of families with children that receive the credit will increase from
84% to 96%, with the largest increase in child credit receipt estimated to
occur among the lowest-income families.65 The proposed Build Back Better
(“BBB”) legislation would have made the expanded child tax credit
permanent;66 however, as the Senate did not consider this legislation before
the end of 2021, the expanded child tax credit expired.67 Analysis by the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (“CBPP”) found that the BBB’s
58. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 129.
59. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022, 131 Stat. 2054, 2073;
see also I.R.C. § 24(h)–(j).
60. I.R.C. § 24(h)(5).
61. TAS Tax Tips: American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 Individual Tax Changes Summary
by Year, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/
news/tas-tax-tips-american-rescue-plan-act-of-2021-individual-tax-changes-summary-byyear/.
62. See I.R.C. § 24(i)(3).
63. See Child Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/
policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-american-families-and-workers/child-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/K4X7-YLFW ] (last visited June 18, 2022).
64. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46839, THE CHILD
TAX CREDIT: THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT (ARPA; P.L. 117-2)
EXPANSION ON INCOME AND POVERTY 12 (2021).
65. Id. at 6.
66. Chuck Marr et al., Build Back Better’s Child Tax Credit Changes Protect Millions
from Poverty—Permanently: Expanded EITC Extended for Adults Without Children, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/11-11-21
tax.pdf.
67. See Ian Prasad Philbrick, Why Isn’t Biden’s Expanded Child Tax Credit More
Popular?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/upshot/bidenchild-tax-credit.html.
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child tax credit expansions would be “expected to benefit more than 65
million children—nearly 90 percent of all children—across the country.”68
As of this writing, the BBB and the permanent expansion of the child tax
credit are in limbo, held up by intraparty congressional wrangling.69
Forman noted that making the child tax credit fully refundable would
mitigate the negative impact on work caused by high phaseout rates.70 Of
course, it also has the benefit of lifting children from poverty.
2. Updated: Universal Grants
Forman recommended replacing personal exemptions and the standard
deduction with universal grants, noting that universal grants preserved the
incentive to work while providing needed income assistance.71 The TCJA
did temporarily eliminate personal exemptions, but it increased the standard
deduction.72 Forman noted several benefits of universal grants. First,
universal grants paid via refundable tax credits would promote economic
justice because refundable tax credits have an equal value to all individuals,
while deductions provide a greater benefit to those in higher tax brackets.73
Second, the EITC, as a negative income tax, is subject to phaseouts that
increase marginal tax rates, and universal grants would not need to be
phased out.74 Therefore, the recipient’s work incentive would not be
reduced as much under universal grants as under a negative income tax,
such as the EITC.75 Finally, universal grants would be simple to
administer.76
Universal grants have been most recently discussed under the term
“universal basic income” or UBI. Although no country has yet adopted a
UBI, several countries and a number of U.S. localities have tried pilot
programs.77 A 2020 World Bank publication lists pilot UBI programs in
68. See Marr et al., supra note 66, at 7.
69. See Philbrick, supra note 67.
70. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 129.
71. Id. at 131.
72. Robert McClelland, Fixing the TCJA: Restore the Personal Exemption, TAX POL’Y
CTR.: TAXVOX (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/fixing-tcja-restorepersonal-exemption.
73. See FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK, supra note 1, at 132.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 133.
77. WORLD BANK GROUP, EXPLORING UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: A GUIDE TO
NAVIGATING CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICES 2 (Ugo Gentilini, Margaret Grosh,
Jamele Rigolini & Ruslan Yemtsov eds., 2020).
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countries including Brazil, Canada, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Uganda.78 In a 2017 paper, Ari Glogower and Clint Wallace examine
several UBI theories.79 They define UBI as a government program that
distributes money to designated beneficiaries without conditions such as
work status, income level, or personal characteristics.80 A key part of the
definition is that beneficiaries have no restrictions on the use of the
money.81 Glogower and Wallace note that the UBI concept is “centuries
old,” having been proposed by Thomas Paine more than two hundred years
ago.82 Glogower and Wallace assert that a UBI is not significantly different
from a progressive income tax with personal exemptions and a standard
deduction83 but, like Forman,84 note that “cash grants can achieve
progressivity while avoiding the disincentive effects of increasing marginal
rates.”85 The cash grant also facilitates periodic payments to beneficiaries,
because it does not require information from the beneficiary to determine
the distribution amount.86
Miranda Perry Fleischer and Daniel Hemel’s 2020 article entitled “The
Architecture of a Basic Income” goes into detail about the possible
structure of a UBI.87 They set out six building blocks for a UBI: the size of
monthly payments; eligibility; uniformity (meaning equal benefits for all);
assignability; payment mechanism; and funding mechanism.88 They
emphasize that UBI design choices must be informed by the philosophical
foundations upon which a UBI rests, which could include welfarism,
resource egalitarianism, and libertarianism.89 Ultimately, Fleischer and
Hemel propose a UBI that replaces much of the current welfare state,
funded by a surtax on wealthy individuals.90 It seems likely that Forman

78. See id. at 237–42.
79. See Ari Glogower & Clint Wallace, Shades of Basic Income 4–5 (NYU 70th Annual
Conference on Labor; Ohio State Pub. L. Working Paper No. 443, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122146#.
80. Id. at 1–2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 10.
84. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
85. Glogower & Wallace, supra note 79, at 14.
86. Id. at 16.
87. Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic Income, 87
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 630 (2020).
88. See id. at 630–31.
89. Id. at 632.
90. Id. at 704.
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would applaud the efforts of such scholars to add rich detail on his
proposal. Collecting such a surtax would inevitably fall upon the IRS. As
described in the next part, scholars, including Forman, have noted that the
continued lack of funding for the IRS hampers its efforts to fairly collect all
the taxes due.
To conclude this update of Making America Work, the individual income
tax continues to dominate federal revenues, with corporate tax revenues and
estate and gift tax revenues continuing to decline. The COVID-19
pandemic created the impetus for adopting a number of Forman’s
recommendations, albeit on a temporary basis. Scholars continue to discuss
UBI proposals, and the IRS continues to suffer from restricted funding.
II. Making the IRS Work (Again)
As noted in Part I, the IRS collects the revenue that funds the federal
government’s activities. Obviously, the proper function of the IRS is critical
to the functioning of the federal government. Nonetheless, Congress has
limited the funds available to the IRS for many years. Recognizing that the
IRS has suffered from a lack of resources, without a meaningful increase in
funding since 2010, we wrote this article in 2015 to provide
recommendations for how the IRS could operate more efficiently given
restricted funding.91 The article contains detailed information about the IRS
funding challenges, including references to comments from the IRS
Oversight Board, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,
the IRS Commissioner, the National Taxpayer Advocate, the American Bar
Association Tax Section, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, journalists, academics, and private practitioners.92
A. IRS Funding Shortfalls
While the IRS funding situation appeared dire at the time we wrote the
article, it steadily got worse. The apparent improvement in 2020 included
2,145 full-time equivalent employees funded through the CARES Act for
IRS COVID response.93 The 2020 staffing level represents a roughly 20%
decrease from 2010.94
91. See Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 763–64 (comparing
operating costs from 2005 through 2014 in nominal and adjusted figures).
92. Id. at 763–72.
93. Table 31: Collections, Costs, Personnel, and U.S. Population, Fiscal Years 1991–
2020, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/20dbs06t31cs.xlsx.
[hereinafter IRS Table 31].
94. See id.
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Fiscal Year

Operating costs
(thousands of
dollars)

Number of fulltime equivalent
employees

U.S. Population
(thousands)

2014

11,591,007

84,133

319,263

2015

11,395,839

79,890

321,540

2016

11,707,422

77,924

323,784

2017

11,526,389

76,832

325,742

2018

11,746,448

73,519

327,407

2019

11,825,241

73,554

328,981

2020

12,316,27595

73,773

330,619

Statistics from the Internal Revenue Service96
Labor costs are about 70% of the IRS budget.97 To cope with the
declining appropriations, the IRS imposed a hiring freeze and other
measures to reduce the workforce.98 The Congressional Budget Office
(“CBO”) reported a 22% decline in the number of overall IRS employees
and a 30% decline in the number of employees working in enforcement
roles.99 Unsurprisingly, both enforcement activity and customer service
suffered at the IRS:
The loss of 15,000 enforcement employees between 2010 and
2018 led to a significant reduction in the number of

95. The FY 2021 IRS budget appropriation was $11.92 billion. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., BUDGET IN BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2022, at 3 (2021), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/
p5530--2021.pdf.
96. See IRS Table 31, supra note 93.
97. CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUBL’N NO. 56422, TRENDS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE’S FUNDING AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/202007/56422-CBO-IRS-enforcement.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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examinations and the number of follow-ups on discrepancies
between returns and third-party data, as well as an increase in
assessments that were not collected and unfiled returns that were
not secured.100
The CBO noted that “[b]etween 2010 and 2018, the share of individual
income tax returns [the IRS] examined fell by 46 percent, and the share of
corporate income tax returns it examined fell by 37 percent.”101
The National Taxpayer Advocate called the 2021 tax return filing season
“the quintessential definition of a perfect storm—a particularly bad or
critical state of affairs, arising from several negative and unpredictable
factors—resulting in tens of millions of taxpayers experiencing hardship
and uncertainty in trying to reach a live assistor.”102 In 2021, only 3% of
callers to the most frequently called IRS line (the “1040 line”) reached a
customer service representative.103 However, the National Taxpayer
Advocate also noted that “in normal, pre-pandemic years,” Congress
funded the IRS at a level that would allow only six out of every ten calls to
the IRS to be answered.104 While the IRS provides face-to-face assistance to
taxpayers at Taxpayer Assistance Centers located around the country, the
IRS has closed forty-three Taxpayer Assistance Centers since 2011, with
twelve closed in 2018 alone.105 In 2020, the IRS temporarily closed all
Taxpayer Assistance Centers due to the pandemic.106
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at ii.
102. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2022, at
10 (2021), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/JRC22_Full
Report.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 19; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, REF. NO. 2019-40-029, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DID NOT FOLLOW
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES BEFORE CLOSING TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE CENTERS; A DATADRIVEN MODEL SHOULD BE USED TO OPTIMIZE LOCATIONS 6 (2019), https://www.oversight.
gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/201940029fr.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN.,
IRS DID NOT FOLLOW CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES]. In 2011, the IRS operated 401
Taxpayer Assistance Centers. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, REF. NO. 2014-40-038, PROCESSES TO DETERMINE OPTIMAL FACE-TO-FACE
TAXPAYER SERVICES, LOCATIONS, AND VIRTUAL SERVICES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED
(2014), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/TIGTA/201440038fr.pdf.
As of the end of 2018, the IRS operated 359 Taxpayer Assistance Centers. TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN., IRS DID NOT FOLLOW CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES, supra, at 1.
106. Taxpayer Assistance Center Statement, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-assistance-center-statement.
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B. Tax Law Complexity
Plus Ça Change, Plus C'est la Même Chose107
As we wrote in our 2015 article, “Much of the complexity in tax
administration comes from Congress constantly tinkering with, and adding
to, the Internal Revenue Code.”108 In addition to inadequate funding,
significant changes in tax legislation increased the IRS workload. In
testimony to Congress, Janet Holtzblatt of the Urban Institute noted some of
the legislative changes that have added to IRS responsibilities:
$

administration of new tax credits for health insurance
coverage and the enforcement of health coverage
mandates (through the Affordable Care Act in 2010);

$

processing of reports of financial assets held abroad by
US citizens and related enforcement actions (through the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act in 2010);

$

acceleration of processing and matching of W-2s to tax
returns combined with a delay of payments of certain
refundable tax credits so that claimants’ earnings could
be verified (through the Protecting Americans from Tax
Hikes Act in 2015);

$

major changes to the tax code in the [TCJA] in 2017;
and

$

three rounds of economic impact payments (the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act and
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY 2021, both in
2020, and the American Rescue Plan in 2021).109

107. This expression is originally credited to an 1849 work by French novelist and author
Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr. The phrase translates into English as “the more things change,
the more they stay the same.” Well-Known Expressions: The More Things Change, The
More They Stay the Same, BOOKBROWSE, https://www.bookbrowse.com/expressions/detail/
index.cfm/expression_number/483/the-more-things-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same
(last visited June 18, 2022).
108. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 772.
109. Janet Holtzblatt, The Effect of Tax Enforcement on Revenues, TAX POL’Y CTR. 2–3
(June 10, 2021), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/104363/the-effect-oftax-enforcement-on-revenues_v2.pdf (statement presented at “Minding the Tax Gap:
Improving Tax Administration for the 21st Century,” a hearing before the Select Revenue
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Holtzblatt concluded that “[a] decade of deep cuts to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) budget has hindered its ability to administer an
increasingly complicated tax code.”110 As we also noted in our 2015 article,
“[l]ate-in-the-year tax legislation adds significant burdens on the IRS to
prepare forms in time for the filing season.”111 The TCJA, called “the most
sweeping tax law change in more than 30 years,” was enacted on December
22, 2017.112 According to a 2020 Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) report,
[M]any of the changes needed to implement TCJA were time
sensitive and extensive. IRS determined it would need to revise
or create nearly 500 tax forms, instructions, and publications to
help taxpayers meet their new tax filing obligations. Also related
to TCJA implementation, IRS officials said they would need to
reprogram information technology (IT) software systems, hire
more than 1,000 new employees, and train the IRS workforce.113
In 2019, the Tax Foundation, a conservative think tank, commented that
the Treasury regulations implementing the TCJA exceeded one thousand
pages.114
While Holtzblatt’s list of the IRS’s burdens from recent legislation is
impressive, I should point out one additional change that significantly
impacted both taxpayer compliance and IRS burdens. Our 2015 article
noted the IRS’s difficulty in auditing large partnerships. We wrote that
“[p]artnerships are notorious for noncompliance and are difficult to audit
effectively.”115 Income from pass-through entities, such as partnerships and
S corporations, makes up the largest portion of the most recently
Measures Subcommittee and Oversight Subcommittee, Ways and Means Committee, U.S.
House of Representatives).
110. Id. at 2.
111. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 773.
112. Fact Sheet FS-2019-2: Be Tax Ready – Understanding Tax Reform Changes
Affecting Individuals and Families, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/be-tax-ready-under
standing-tax-reform-changes-affecting-individuals-and-families (May 31, 2022); Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
113. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-103, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT:
CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IMPLEMENTING BUSINESS PROVISIONS, BUT IRS FACES
ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 1 (2020), http://www.gao.gov/pdf/product/
704836.
114. Garrett Watson, Two Years After Passage, Treasury Regulations for the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act Surpass 1,000 Pages, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/
treasury-regulations-for-the-tcja/.
115. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 777.
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determined underreporting tax gap.116 In 2020, Chye-Ching Huang of the
CBPP noted that “[t]he audit rates for both S Corporation and partnership
returns have fallen by more than 40 percent since 2010, to just 0.2
percent.”117
In our 2015 article, we explained that the partnership audit regime
enacted in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(“TEFRA”) streamlined the audit procedures for partnerships, allowing the
IRS to audit the partnership rather than the individual partners, thereby
easing the IRS’s burdens.118 However, shortly after publication of our
article, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 repealed the TEFRA partnership
audit provisions, replacing them with the centralized partnership audit
regime (“CPAR”).119 Commentators have been quite critical of CPAR,
noting that it appeared to be hastily enacted without much consideration
and stating “Congress abruptly abandoned TEFRA, effectively giving up
due process and fairness in favor of revenue and administrative
convenience.”120 It is far from clear, however, that CPAR has actually
produced administrative convenience for the IRS. The same commentators
noted that the statutory provision and the guidance produced by Treasury
and the IRS is “exquisitely detailed, complex, and sometimes confusing.”121
CPAR became effective for tax years beginning in 2018.122 “Over the
summer of 2021, the IRS launched the Large Partnership Compliance
(LPC) program, using data analytics to select 2019 tax year large
partnership returns for audit.”123 It remains to be seen whether this change
116. Pass-through income constitutes 32% of the underreporting tax gap and “includes
income from partnerships, S corporations, sole proprietors, estates, trusts, farms, and rents
and royalties.” Depletion of IRS Enforcement Is Undermining the Tax Code: Testimony of
Chye-Ching Huang, Senior Director for Economic Policy, CBPP, Before the House Ways
and Means Committee, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 4 fig.2 (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-11-20tax.pdf.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 780.
119. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 became law on November 2, 2015. BBA
Centralized Partnership Audit Regime, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/partnerships/bba-centralized-partnership-audit-regime (Mar. 8, 2022); see also
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584.
120. WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS & PARTNERS ¶
10A.01 (2022).
121. Id.
122. See BBA Centralized Partnership Audit Regime, supra note 119.
123. Greg Armstrong et al., IRS Launches Large Partnership Audits, BLOOMBERG TAX
(Nov. 3, 2021, 3:45 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/tax-insights-and-commentary/irslaunches-large-partnership-audits.
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to the partnership audit rules will help the IRS to more efficiently collect
taxes due from partnership operations.
C. Recommendations
1. Increase IRS Funding
Our first recommendation in our 2015 article was to increase funding for
the IRS.124 One measure of the IRS’s effectiveness is the tax gap. “The
gross tax gap is the difference between a taxpayer’s true tax liability and the
amounts paid on time,” while the net tax gap reflects the additional tax
collected by IRS efforts and can be defined as “the amount of true tax
liability that is not paid on time and is not collected.”125 As of November
2021, the latest tax gap estimates are for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013.126
These estimates are substantially unchanged from those discussed in our
2015 article, which came from a 2006 analysis. The latest tax gap estimates
show an average gross tax gap of $441 billion per year.127 After factoring in
late payments and enforcement efforts, the net tax gap was estimated at
$381 billion.128 The tax gap is comprised of three main components: nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment.129 The non-filing tax gap is the
tax not paid on time by those who do not file the required returns on
time.130 The underreporting tax gap is the net understatement of tax on
timely filed returns.131 The underpayment tax gap is the amount of tax
reported on timely filed returns that is not paid on time.132 As in prior years,
the largest part of the tax gap was the underreporting element, constituting
80% of the gross tax gap.133 Individual income tax constituted the largest
portion of the underreporting tax gap at roughly 70%.134 Income that is not
124. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 781.
125. Id. at 749.
126. The Tax Gap, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-taxgap (Nov. 2, 2021).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Fact Sheet FS-2005-14: Understanding the Tax Gap, IRS (Mar. 2005), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-05-14.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Primer: Understanding the Tax Gap, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED.
BUDGET (June 17, 2021), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/primer-understanding-tax-gap#end2.
133. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH:
TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 11 (Sept. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf.
134. Id. at 12.
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subject to third-party information reporting constitutes a net misreporting
percentage of 55% for individual income tax.135 In light of Congress’s
continued failure to increase the IRS budget, it should come as no surprise
that the tax gap remains stubbornly unchanged.
The BBB proposal discussed in Section I.B. would have added $80
billion in mandatory funding for the IRS over the next ten years. 136 While
the BBB proposal, which aimed to increase IRS funding, passed the House
in November 2021,137 it did not pass the Senate, because one Democratic
senator in the evenly divided chamber could not support the bill, in part due
to its cost.138 Lawmakers wanted to see the official CBO estimate of the
BBB’s cost139 to compare it with the estimate made by the Office of Tax
Analysis (“OTA”) at the Department of the Treasury. OTA’s estimate
found that increasing the IRS’s funding would generate a net $400 billion in
new revenue due to investments in IRS enforcement targeted at highincome individuals, complex partnerships, and large corporations.140 These
investments would
1) provide a high direct return on investment; 2) generate
increasingly more revenue over time; 3) have a beneficial effect
on voluntary compliance when coupled with investments in
technology and taxpayer services; and 4) have a large deterrent
135. Id. at 13.
136. See Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Dir., Cong. Budget Off., to Sen. Lindsey
Graham, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Budget, U.S. Senate (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-11/57620-IRS.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Swagel to
Graham].
137. US House Passes the Build Back Better Act with Significant Tax Proposals, MOSS
ADAMS (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.mossadams.com/articles/2021/11/build-back-betteract-passes-us-house; Build Back Better Act, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. § 138401 (as passed by
House, Nov. 19, 2021).
138. See Emily Cochrane & Catie Edmondson, Manchin Pulls Support from Biden’s
Social Policy Bill, Imperiling Its Passage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/12/19/us/politics/manchin-build-back-better.html.
139. See Letter from Ed Case et al., Reps., U.S. House of Reps., to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Reps. (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=
0000017c-e238-d46d-affd-f27af44e0000.
140. Jean Ross & Seth Hanlon, The Build Back Better Act’s Investment in the IRS Will
Substantially Reduce the Tax Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.
americanprogress.org/article/the-build-back-better-acts-investments-in-the-irs-will-substanti
ally-reduce-the-tax-gap/; see also Lily Batchelder, Preliminary Estimates Show Build Back
Better Legislation Will Reduce Deficits, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Nov. 4, 2021), https://home.
treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/preliminary-estimates-show-build-back-better-legislation
-will-reduce-deficits.
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effect that is not included in many analyses of the revenue
effects of IRS investment.141
But due to the CBO’s scoring guidelines that prevent it from taking into
account the indirect effect of the funding, the CBO’s estimate only
considered the $80 billion cost of additional funding.142 In an informal
analysis, the CBO found a net $127 billion increase in revenue resulting
from the additional IRS funding.143
2. Simplify the Internal Revenue Code
After increasing the funding available for the IRS, our next
recommendation was to simplify the tax code. We wrote that “[t]he
complexity of the tax system increases the burdens on both taxpayers and
the IRS. Complexity erodes voluntary compliance with the tax laws, creates
a perception of unfairness for the system, and impedes the effective
administration of the tax laws.”144 Despite increasing IRS workload and
adding complexity to business and international taxes, the TCJA provided
some simplification for individual taxpayers.145 The TCJA temporarily
increased the standard deduction for individuals and reduced their ability to
take some itemized deductions.146 Taxpayers have a choice: they may elect
to itemize their deductions or take the standard deduction.147 The standard
deduction provides the same benefit regardless of the taxpayer’s actual
expenses; the amount of the itemized deduction depends on the taxpayer’s
qualifying expenses, such as home mortgage interest, state and local taxes,
and charitable contributions.148 Taxpayers will elect to itemize deductions if
the total allowable itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction.
141. Ross & Hanlon, supra note 140.
142. See Scott Levy, Note, Spending Money to Make Money: CBO Scoring of Secondary
Effects, 127 YALE L.J. 936, 941–42 (2018) (providing a detailed explanation of CBO’s
scoring guidelines, accompanied by analysis) (“Put . . . broadly, [CBO’s] scoring guidelines
skew congressional deliberations in such a way that important policy considerations, like
efficiency and equity, fall by the wayside.”).
143. Letter from Swagel to Graham, supra note 136.
144. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 782.
145. Erica York & Alex Muresianu, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Simplified the Tax Filing
Process for Millions of Households, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://taxfoundation.
org/the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-simplified-the-tax-filing-process-for-millions-of-americans/.
146. Id.
147. See I.R.C. § 63(a)–(b).
148. The home mortgage interest deduction (I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)), the state and local tax
deduction (I.R.C. § 164), and the charitable contribution deduction (I.R.C. § 170) are all
non-miscellaneous itemized deductions under I.R.C. § 67(b). See id. § 67(b).
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Because the TCJA doubled the standard deduction, it is less likely that a
taxpayer’s itemized deductions will exceed the standard deduction. Before
the TCJA, approximately one-third of taxpayers elected to itemize
deductions.149 After the TCJA, only about 10% of taxpayers elected to
itemize.150
In addition to increasing the standard deduction, the TCJA temporarily
restricted the ability of taxpayers to take certain itemized deductions.
Before the TCJA, homeowners could deduct the interest on “home equity
debt,” which was up to $100,000 of the principal amount of the debt
secured by the equity in their home.151 The loan proceeds could be used for
any purpose.152 The TCJA disallowed the deduction of interest on home
equity debt.153 Before the TCJA, home purchasers could deduct the interest
on up to $1 million of acquisition debt, that is, a loan used to acquire,
construct, or substantially improve the taxpayer’s residence.154 After the
TCJA, the deduction is limited to the interest on $750,000 of acquisition
debt. Before the TCJA, taxpayers could deduct all their state and local
income and property taxes (the “SALT deduction”).155 After the TCJA, the
SALT deduction is limited to $10,000 annually.156 The TCJA expanded the
availability of the charitable contribution deduction. Prior to the TCJA, the
annual charitable contribution deduction was limited to 50% of the
taxpayer’s contribution limit, which is generally the taxpayer’s adjusted
gross income (“AGI”).157 The TCJA temporarily increased the limit to 60%
149. Scott Eastman, How Many Taxpayers Itemize Under Current Law?, TAX FOUND.
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/standard-deduction-itemized-deductions-currentlaw-2019/ (reporting 31.1% of taxpayers itemizing prior to the TCJA).
150. Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System – How Did the TCJA Change
the Standard Deduction and Itemized Deductions?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicy
center.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcja-change-standard-deduction-and-itemized-deductions
(May 2020) [hereinafter How Did the TCJA Change the Standard Deduction and Itemized
Deductions?].
151. See id.
152. Stephen Fishman, When Home Mortgage Interest Is Not Tax Deductible, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-home-mortgage-interest-is-not-deductible.
html (last visited June 9, 2022).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Jim Probasco, Tax Deductions That Went Away, Starting with 2018 Taxes,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 30, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/tax-deductions-that-are-going
-away-4582165.
156. See Eastman, supra note 149.
157. See How Did the TCJA Change the Standard Deduction and Itemized Deductions?,
supra note 150.
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of the taxpayer’s contribution limit, provided that the taxpayer contributed
only in cash.158 The TCJA also created a permanent $300 (or $600 for
married taxpayers filing jointly) charitable contribution deduction for nonitemizers.159
The TCJA also temporarily disallowed all miscellaneous itemized
deductions.160 Miscellaneous itemized deductions are deductions authorized
by the Internal Revenue Code but not listed as an “above-the-line”
deduction161 or non-miscellaneous itemized deduction. Commonly used
miscellaneous itemized deductions included unreimbursed employee
business expenses162 and the deduction for the cost of tax preparation.163
Most itemized deductions are considered tax expenditures by the Joint
Committee on Taxation.164 In our 2015 article, we noted that tax
expenditures cost revenue and add to the IRS’s administrative burden,
stating that “[r]epealing tax expenditures or, at least, adding limits to them
can also reduce the number of disputes between taxpayers and the IRS.”165
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the TCJA temporarily repealed and
limited tax expenditures.
In the case of the TCJA, the price of simplification may be inequality.
Itemized deductions are also “upside-down subsidies.”166 The value of a tax
deduction depends on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate; because a tax
158. IRS Tax Reform Tax Tip 2018-176: Tax Reform Affects If and How Taxpayers
Itemize Their Deductions, IRS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-reformaffects-if-and-how-taxpayers-itemize-their-deductions.
159. I.R.C. § 170(p).
160. See How Did the TCJA Change the Standard Deduction and Itemized Deductions?,
supra note 150.
161. “Above-the-line” deductions refer to those deductions allowed in determining
adjusted gross income. See William L. Rudkin Testamentary Tr. v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149,
152 (2d Cir. 2006). See generally I.R.C. § 62.
162. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) provides that trade or business deductions are considered in
determining adjusted gross income “if such trade or business does not consist of the
performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee.” I.R.C. § 62(a)(1).
163. Id. § 212(3).
164. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PUB. NO. JCX-23-20, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024, at 2 (2020) (“[T]ax expenditures include any
reductions in income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that
provide tax benefits to particular taxpayers.”); see also id. at 28 (showing that the deduction
for mortgage interest will reduce federal revenues by $125.2 billion over the five-year period
between 2020 and 2024).
165. Forman & Mann, Making the IRS Work, supra note 2, at 781.
166. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1155, 1159 (“[T]ax expenditures often provide an ‘upside-down’ subsidy: benefits from tax
expenditures tend to increase along with the recipient’s wealth.”).
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deduction reduces taxable income, it reduces tax liability by the amount of
the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. For example, a
$1,000 deduction for a taxpayer with a 22% marginal tax rate is worth
$220, but for a taxpayer in the 37% tax bracket, the same $1,000 deduction
is worth $370. While the use of itemized deductions has declined for most
taxpayers after the TCJA, nearly the same percentage of taxpayers in the
top 1% of the income distribution still elect to itemize.167 The Institute on
Economic Policy and Taxation estimated that in 2020, 72% of the tax cuts
from the TCJA went to the richest 20% of taxpayers, with an average tax
cut of $60 for the poorest 20% and an average tax cut of almost $50,000 for
the top 1%.168
Although the TCJA simplified individual taxation, it complicated the
taxation of businesses. A report from the Tax Policy Center (“TPC”) found
two main sources of complexity in the TCJA. The first source of
complexity is the new international tax provisions (which go by the
acronyms GILTI, BEAT, and FDII) that limit the ability of U.S. and
foreign-based multinationals to shift reported profits from the United States
to low-tax foreign countries by creating new categories of income and
expenses that will take years for corporations and the government to sort
out. The second source of complexity is the new distinctions that the TCJA
created “between (a) tax rates on earnings and business income of
individual taxpayers and (b) between profits of C corporations and passthrough businesses.”169
The international tax provisions added by the TCJA are beyond the scope
of this Article,170 but the so-called pass-through deduction created a
significant change in the taxation of the most common business entities. As
the TPC report noted, the changes to corporate and pass-through taxation
“will lead to significant tax planning costs as taxpayers try to figure out
how to organize their employment status and business affairs to qualify for
the 20 percent pass-through deduction and businesses try to determine

167. See Eastman, supra note 149 (reporting only a 2.5% decree in itemization for
taxpayers in the 0% to 20% income group).
168. TCJA by the Numbers, 2020, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://itep.org/tcja-2020/.
169. WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., TAX POL’Y CTR., EFFECTS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS
ACT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 17 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf.
170. For a complete analysis of the international tax system for corporations, see JANE G.
GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45186, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE TAXATION: THE 2017 REVISION (P.L. 115-97) (2021).
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whether to change from pass-through to C corporation status.”171 In
particular, the pass-through deduction, codified at § 199A of the Internal
Revenue Code,172 attracted significant criticism.173 Professor and former
Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff Ed Kleinbard called it
“Congress’ worst tax idea ever.”174 Section 199A created a new temporary
deduction for pass-through income as a companion to the TCJA’s reduction
in corporate tax rates from 35% to 21%.175 In broad strokes, the § 199A
deduction permits individuals, trusts, and estates with pass-through business
income to deduct up to 20% of their qualified business income in
determining their federal income tax liability.176 If the pass-through
business owner’s taxable income exceeds a statutory threshold, the
deduction will be limited by the owner’s share of the business’s W-2 wages
and the original cost (or unadjusted basis) of the business’s depreciable
capital assets.177 In addition, if the business is a “specified service trade or
business” (“SSTB”), the deduction may be entirely phased out if the
owner’s taxable income exceeds the statutory limit.178 An SSTB is any
trade or business primarily engaged in “accounting, health, law, actuarial
science, athletics, brokerage services, consulting, financial services, . . . the
performing arts, . . . investing and investment management, trading, or
dealing in securities, partnership interests, or commodities.”179
The CRS’s analysis of the § 199A deduction noted that it “has
implications for the cost and complexity of tax administration and taxpayer
171. GALE ET AL., supra note 169, at 17.
172. See I.R.C. § 199A.
173. See Ari Glogower & David Kamin, The Progressivity Ratchet, 104 MINN. L. REV.
1499, 1522–23 (2020).
174. Edward Kleinbard, Congress’ Worst Tax Idea Ever, HILL (Mar. 25, 2019, 9:00 AM
ET), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/434998-congress-worst-tax-idea-ever. Ed Kleinbard
is another tax giant who we recently lost. Esteemed Tax Scholar and USC Gould Professor
Edward Kleinbard, 68: The Committed Educator and Influential Author Passed Away June
28, USC NEWS (June 30, 2020), https://news.usc.edu/172628/edward-kleinbard-obituaryusc-gould/.
175. See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46402, THE SECTION 199A DEDUCTION:
HOW IT WORKS AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 1 (2020) (explaining that the § 199A
deduction is available from 2018 to 2025) [hereinafter GUENTHER, THE SECTION 199A
DEDUCTION]; GALE ET AL., supra note 169, at 5 (“TCJA reduce[d] the top corporate income
tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent . . . .”); id. at 12 (noting the TCJA provisions were
temporary). The corporate rate cut, in contrast, is permanent. See id. at 1.
176. GUENTHER, THE SECTION 199A DEDUCTION, supra note 175, at 1.
177. Id. at 3, 11.
178. Id. at 3, 5.
179. Id. at ii.
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compliance.”180 The report found that the IRS would likely face significant
cost in administering the deduction because “[e]xtensive audits may be
necessary to ensure that claims for the deduction are legitimate and correct
in amount for the following reasons:
$ the complexity of the deduction’s final regulations . . . ;
$ remaining uncertainties about the specific activities that
do and do not qualify for it; and
$ a lack of clarity among pass-through business owners
about how the rules may affect them and the deduction’s
potential benefits.”181
Using a framework for complexity developed by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the report concluded that the § 199A is a tax-complex provision
because “[i]t is temporary (the deduction expires at the end of 2025);
Congress has given the IRS broad authority to set rules for the deduction;
and there is a lack of clarity in some of the rules governing the use of the
deduction, impeding its uptake.”182 Concerns about the deduction’s
“uptake” might be misplaced, if not concerns about its complexity. A recent
report by the CBPP found that the pass-through deduction’s complex
“guardrails” did not prevent more than 91% of pass-through business
income from qualifying for the deduction.183 Pertinent to the subject of our
2015 article, the CBPP report also noted that
[§ 199A’s] arbitrariness and potential for abuse weaken[s] the
integrity of the entire income tax and add[s] new burdens to an
already under-resourced IRS, which has suffered deep funding
cuts since 2010. Tax noncompliance by pass-through
businesses—in particular, underreporting of income—is the
single largest source of the nation’s tax gap.184
The § 199A deduction is not only complex but also inequitable. The
aforementioned CBPP report noted that 61% of § 199A’s estimated tax

180. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46650, SECTION 199A DEDUCTION:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY OPTIONS 7 (2021).
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id. at 10.
183. Samantha Jacoby, Repealing Flawed “Pass-Through” Deduction Should Be Part of
Recovery Legislation, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 5 (June 1, 2021), https://www.
cbpp.org/sites/default/files/6-1-21tax.pdf.
184. Id. at 6.
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benefit in 2024 would accrue to the top 1% of the income distribution, with
less than 4% of the benefit accruing to the bottom two-thirds of the income
distribution.185 Another of Professor Forman’s co-authors, Caroline
Bruckner, analyzed the effect of the § 199A deduction on women-owned
businesses.186 Bruckner noted that half of women-owned businesses are
concentrated in three industries that qualify as SSTBs: other services; health
care and social assistance; and professional, scientific, and technical
services.187 As previously noted, the § 199A deduction is not allowed for
owners of SSTBs with incomes exceeding the threshold.188 Fortunately,
perhaps, as almost 90% of women business owners (“WBOs”) operate
businesses that have revenues below $100,000, most WBOs will be able to
claim some portion of the § 199A deduction.189 That very fact, however,
indicates the distributional inequities of the provision: as Bruckner notes,
“only 1.7 percent of women-business owners have receipts of $1,000,000 or
more,” and by 2024, 52% of the benefit of the § 199A deduction will flow
to businesses with receipts exceeding $1 million.190 In short, I think
Professor Forman would probably agree with Professor Kleinbard that the
§ 199A deduction was one of Congress’s worst ideas ever.
To conclude this update of Making the IRS Work, much has remained the
same. The workload of the IRS continues to increase, but its funding does
not. Some portion of Congress has acknowledged that the economy would
benefit from increasing IRS funding, but the Senate has not yet passed the
BBB. There has been no significant progress on closing the tax gap. The
TCJA temporarily simplified tax filing for individuals, but at the potential
cost of fairness. The TCJA increased complexity for business and
international taxpayers.
III. Making Sustainable Tax Policy (Borrowing from Millennials)
While our 2015 article focused on the IRS and its role in the tax system,
our next article took a broader look at how to make tax policy writ large
sustainable for future generations. We identified the issue as follows:

185. Id. at 1, 4.
186. Caroline Bruckner, Doubling Down on a Billion Dollar Blind Spot: Women
Business Owners and Tax Reform, 9 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2020).
187. Id. at 11.
188. See supra note 178.
189. Bruckner, supra note 186, at 26.
190. See id. at 26–27.
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Despite a progressive tax rate structure, income and wealth
inequality have significantly increased in the U.S. and other
countries over the past thirty years. Future taxpayers may well be
in a very different situation than current taxpayers, both from
increasing income and wealth inequality and from the
anticipated increasing burden of government deficits.191
We concluded that “to attain sustainable intergenerational justice, the
current generation must ensure that future generations have adequate
resources to sustain life and prosperity.”192 Moreover, we assumed that
intergenerational justice “demands that future generations should be able to
live at least as well as we do.”193 The article provided some tax design
considerations that could help achieve that goal and covered three basic
themes: (1) the effect of the budget deficit, (2) income and wealth
inequality, and (3) the opportunities for future generations to thrive.
A. Budget Deficit
The deficit has increased since the article’s 2020 publication, largely due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in Part I, economists disagree about
budget deficits.194 What is clear, however, is that the budget deficit
increased substantially in 2020 and 2021, amounting to $3 trillion in
2021.195 The CBO noted that 2020’s deficit was the largest since 1945.196
Because deficits represent current spending that must be repaid later,
deficits are an intergenerational issue. In our analysis of the deficit in our
2020 article, we noted that “[a]lthough deficit spending can be beneficial in
times of recession by creating a short-term economic stimulus, in times of
robust economic growth, deficit spending can crowd out private
investment.”197 However, since publication of our 2020 article, the U.S.
economy peaked and began to decline, marking the end of the longest

191. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 801 (footnotes
omitted).
192. Id. at 802.
193. Id. at 805.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
195. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE UPDATED BUDGET
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2021 TO 2031, at 5 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/file-download/
download/private/162587.
196. Id.
197. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 807.
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recorded U.S. economic expansion.198 The pandemic and resultant
shutdowns created an unprecedented economic crisis.199 GDP “recorded its
steepest quarterly drop in economic output . . . in the second quarter of
2020.”200 In April 2020, the unemployment rate reached its highest number
since recordkeeping began in 1948: 14.8%.201
Congress acted swiftly to provide relief. As a result, the COVID-19
recession lasted only two months before recovery began. The Family First
Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”),202 enacted on March 18, 2020,
provided up to ten weeks of paid family and medical leave for employees of
certain small and midsize private employers, funded by employer tax
credits.203 FFCRA also expanded funding for food assistance.204 The
CARES Act, enacted on March 27, 2020,205 provided forgivable payroll
protection loans; larger unemployment benefits; an employee retention
credit for small businesses; and direct cash payments, structured as advance
tax refunds.206 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, enacted on December
27, 2020,207 extended prior COVID-19 relief provisions and provided
additional funding for schools and universities.208 The ARPA, enacted on
March 11, 2021,209 accomplished the following:

198. LAUREN BAUER ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, TEN FACTS ABOUT COVID-19 AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY 2 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Future
Shutdowns_Facts_LO_Final.pdf (noting that the expansion of the U.S. economy began in
June 2009 and peaked in February 2020).
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id. at 2.
201. GENE FALK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 5 (2021).
202. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178
(2020).
203. Jim Probasco, What Is the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA),
INVESTOPEDIA (July 21, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/what-is-the-families-firstcoronavirus-response-act-4802576.
204. Id.
205. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136. 134
Stat. 281 (2020).
206. Sharon Parrott et al., CARES Act Includes Essential Measures to Respond to Public
Health, Economic Crises, but More Will Be Needed, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1
(2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-27-20econ.pdf; FAQs: Employee
Retention Credit Under the CARES Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/faqs-employee-retention-credit-under-the-cares-act (Dec. 27, 2021).
207. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182.
208. Summary of the Higher Education Provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2021, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. 1–2 (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/
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$

“provide[d] a one-time direct payment of $1,400 per
person to eligible households;

$

temporarily expand[ed] the child tax credit for low- and
moderate-income families, . . . the [EITC] for workers
without qualifying children, . . . the child and dependent
care credit for most taxpayers and . . . the exclusion for
child and dependent care expenses;

$

modifie[d] and extend[ed] the payroll tax credits for
employer-provided paid sick and paid family leave;

$

further extend[ed] the employee retention tax credit;
[and]

$

temporarily . . . expand[ed] eligibility for the health
insurance premium tax credit.”210

In total, by the end of 2021, the federal government had approved $4.5
trillion in COVID-related spending.211
The stimulus legislation, while increasing the deficit, has had positive
economic results. As of May 2022, the unemployment rate dropped to
3.6%, more than ten percentage points lower than at the peak of the
economic crisis.212 The CBO projected real GDP growth at a robust 7.4%
for 2021.213 An extended economic recession would not have benefitted
future generations, because it would have made it more difficult for them to
find jobs. Moreover, the COVID-19 legislation has had a transformative
effect on the economy, making it more resilient and future-proof, as
discussed in Section C below.
Summary-Higher-Education-Provisions-in-the-Consolidated-Appropriations-Act-of-2021.
pdf.
209. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4.
210. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46680, THE AMERICAN RESCUE
PLAN OF 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2): TITLE IX, SUBTITLE G—TAX PROVISIONS RELATED TO
PROMOTING ECONOMIC SECURITY 1 (2021).
211. Charley Locke, How the $4 Trillion Flood of Covid Relief Is Funding the Future,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/24/magazine/pandem
ic-aid.html.
212. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited June 9, 2022) (reporting a peak of
14.7% unemployment in April 2020).
213. CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2021
TO 2031, at 3–4 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-07/57218-Outlook.pdf
[hereinafter CBO, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET].
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Concerns about inflation have moderated the positive economic outlook.
Demand for goods and services exceeded supply in the second half of 2021,
leading to the highest inflation rate since 1982.214 CBO projects that
inflation will moderate in 2022 as supply is anticipated to adjust to
demand.215 Analysis by the Brookings Institution explains why inflation is
not as bad as it looks:
Because prices fell in 2020, one-year changes from August 2020
to August 2021 overstate the increase in inflation since the
pandemic began. Instead, focusing on the annualized rate of
inflation since February 2020 shows that inflation through
August 2021 (as measured by the core consumer price index)
was 3.1 percent, substantially lower than the one-year trend but
still higher than any annual increase since the early 1990s. There
are two primary reasons why the rise in inflation is unlikely to
persist. First, the significant shifts in demand and bottlenecks are
a function of the recent, temporary pace of economic
activity. . . . Second, as production is increased (with
normalization of global supply chains) and growth in demand
abates, inflation should slow overall.216
While the economic outlook is considerably improved, the impact of the
pandemic was unevenly felt among Americans. Income inequality in the
United States has been increasing since the 1980s, as our 2020 article
discussed,217 and the pandemic exacerbated that trend. As the next section
discusses, income inequality limits opportunity for future generations.218
The tax system could help reverse the trend.

214. Rachel Siegel, Prices Climbed 6.8% in November Compared with Last Year,
Largest Rise in Nearly Four Decades, as Inflation Spreads Through Economy, WASH. POST
(Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/12/10/inflation-novembercpi-fed-biden/.
215. CBO, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET, supra note 213, at 3.
216. MITCHELL BARNES ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, 11 FACTS ON THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY FROM THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 2–3 (2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/COVID-Facts-v3.pdf.
217. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 804.
218. See id. at 833 (“For example, Sweden is a country with relatively low poverty rates,
a low level of economic inequality, and much better prospects for upward economic mobility
than the U.S.”).
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B. Income and Wealth Inequality
Throughout our 2020 article, we referred to the problem of inequality.219
As we noted, income inequality is linked to reduced life expectancy.220
Increasing progressivity in tax rates can address income inequality, but
progressivity in the U.S. tax system has decreased since 1979.221 Because
higher-income Americans more frequently access tax incentives for
education and homeownership, these incentives may have exacerbated
inequality.222 We opined that “[i]t would be appropriate to curb the tax
breaks for homeownership and redirect American spending towards
investments that would lead to economic growth or to investments in
sustainable assets like energy-saving windows and furnaces, or both.”223
Moreover, those incentives narrow the tax base. As we noted, “Exclusions,
deductions, credits, and many other tax expenditures shrink each of these
tax bases. As a result, tax rates must be higher on each taxable base to
collect the revenues needed.”224 A broader tax base benefits future
generations because more economic activity will be taxed, thereby allowing
marginal tax rates to be lower and leading to “more economic growth and
more economic resources for future generations.”225
According to the OECD, countries with higher average levels of
wellbeing tend to have greater equality between socio-demographic groups
(such as by gender, age, or education).226 In the United States, the top 20%
of the income distribution earns 8.4 times more than the bottom 20% of the
income distribution.227 For comparison, the same statistic is 3.5 times for

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 801, 804, 828–29, 833, 840–42.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 828–29.
See id. at 839–42.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 830 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 832.
See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HOW’S LIFE? 2020:
MEASURING WELL-BEING 31 (2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/how-s-life/
volume-/issue-_9870c393-en#page1 [hereinafter HOW’S LIFE? 2020].
227. In its analysis, the OECD considered data obtained from 2017 for the United States.
Id. at 65. The income-share ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% was 8.4 in
2017; the most current data from 2019 still reports a ratio of 8.4. Income Distribution
Database, OECD.STAT, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD (click “by
country” under “Income Distribution Database” in the lefthand menu; then click “United
States” from the dropdown in the “Country” field at the top of the table) (last visited June
18, 2022).
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Iceland228 and 5.4 times for the OECD average.229 On wellbeing metrics,
the United States surpasses the OECD average on environmental quality
and in most knowledge and skills.230 The OECD report has no data on life
satisfaction in the United States,231 but the United States scores lower than
the OECD average on work-life balance, social connections, and safety.232
The United States also has a lower life expectancy than the OECD average:
78.6 years for the United States compared to 80.5 years for a person born in
2017.233 The United States also has a higher percentage of the population
living in relative poverty: 18% in the United States234 compared to the
OECD average of 12%.235
The statistics cited above show that the United States has an inequality
problem. However, the U.S. tax system exacerbates not only income and
wealth inequality, but also gender and racial inequality. The tax system’s
disparate racial impact has been the subject of much recent research.236 A
228. The OECD considered 2015 data for Iceland. HOW’S LIFE? 2020, supra note 226, at
65. In 2015, Iceland’s income-share ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% was
3.6. Income Distribution Database, supra note 227 (click “by country” under “Income
Distribution Database” in the lefthand menu; then click “Iceland” from the dropdown in the
“Country” field at the top of the table). The most current data—from 2017—reports a ratio
of 3.5. Id.
229. The OECD average was obtained from the most recent data for each country at the
time of publication. HOW’S LIFE? 2020, supra note 226, at 65.
230. Id. at 129–33 (environmental quality) (reporting levels below the OECD average for
population exposure to PM2.5 above the World Health Organization threshold); id. at 116–
26 (knowledge and skills) (reporting levels above the OECD average for reading and science
skills of ages fifteen plus and for adult literacy proficiency but lower than the OECD average
for ages fifteen plus math skills and adult numeracy proficiency).
231. Id. at 28.
232. Id. at 158–67 (work-life balance) (reporting levels below the OECD average for
time off of those with full-time employment); id. 171–80 (social connections) (reporting
levels below the OECD average for time allocated to social interactions); id. at 149–54
(safety) (reporting levels above the OECD average for homicide rates and road deaths).
233. Id. at 104–05.
234. The 2019 poverty rate after taxes and transfers for all age groups in the United
States was 0.18. Income Distribution Database, supra note 227 (click “by country” under
“Income Distribution Database” in the lefthand menu; then click “United States” from the
dropdown in the “Country” field at the top of the table) (last visited June 18, 2022).
235. HOW’S LIFE? 2020, supra note 226, at 65–66. “Relative poverty” is defined as less
than or equal to half of the national median income. Id. at 65.
236. See, e.g., Vanessa Williamson, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Requires Heavy,
Progressive Taxation of Wealth, BROOKINGS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/research/closing-the-racial-wealth-gap-requires-heavy-progressive-taxation-of-wealth/;
DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES
BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021); Aravind Boddupalli & Kim S.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

728

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:691

sustainable tax system must be sustainable for all future generations, not
just the currently economically privileged.
It is difficult to determine the racial impact of the Internal Revenue Code
and tax enforcement because the Treasury Department does not track data
by race.237 The scholars who have written about the tax system’s racial
impact have had to extrapolate by combining census data on race and
ethnicity with IRS data on income.238 On his first day in office, President
Biden signed an executive order requiring disaggregation of federal data by
race.239 On December 14, 2021, the Treasury announced its progress on
equity analysis of tax policy by examining implementation of economic
impact payments made during the pandemic.240 The announcement noted
that “[o]nce this work is completed, we plan to publish statistics on the
composition of [economic impact payment] recipients, including estimates
of race and ethnicity and other demographic characteristics.”241 The
Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy also announced that it is
“attempting to develop a general and reliable empirical methodology for
analyzing the racial/ethnic equity implications of tax policy and tax
Rueben, How Income Taxes Interact with Racial Disparities, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-income-taxes-interact-racialdisparities; Steven M. Rosenthal, Retirement Tax Benefits Exacerbate Racial Inequities, TAX
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/retirementtax-benefits-exacerbate-racial-inequities-0; Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the IRS Know
Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1 (2019).
237. Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Colorblind Tax Enforcement, 97 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12
(2022).
238. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Measuring Disparate Racial Tax Outcomes Before
and After the TCJA, TAX NOTES (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/featuredanalysis/measuring-disparate-racial-tax-outcomes-and-after-tcja/2021/03/12/3k6b8 (“To
examine the effects of the TCJA, we gathered from our data set of 27,000 the 400 ZIP
codes with AGI growth rates closest to the national average of 5.7 percent (ranging from
5.6 percent to 5.8 percent). We then divided that data into 10 deciles, sorting them by size
of the tax reduction from 2017 to 2018. . . . [I]n general, for ZIP codes with large racial
minority populations, the percentage point reduction in tax rates was smaller than the
reduction in predominantly white ZIP codes. For the lowest decile (37.1 percent racial
minority), the effective rate reduction was 0.6 percentage points. For the highest decile
(11.4 percent racial minority), the effective rate reduction was 2.3 percentage points.
These results suggest that the TCJA provided more benefits as a percentage of AGI to
white over racial minority taxpayers.”).
239. See Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 21, 2021).
240. Wally Adeyemo & Lily Batchelder, Advancing Equity Analysis in Tax Policy, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 14, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/
advancing-equity-analysis-in-tax-policy.
241. Id.
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administration questions, which could ultimately
understanding of the effectiveness and equity of
provisions.”242 This data could help support changes to
could improve fairness and provide future generations
to build wealth.243
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C. Opportunities for Future Generations
As we noted in our 2020 article, the failure of the current generation to
adequately invest in infrastructure, climate change mitigation, and
education threatens the wellbeing of future generations.244
1. Infrastructure
As we noted, “Adequate infrastructure is essential for future
prosperity.”245 The American Society of Civil Engineers agrees.246 The CRS
noted that “[e]conomists generally agree that infrastructure is a critical
factor of economic well-being, enabling private businesses and individuals
to produce goods and services in a more efficient manner.”247 While
spending has not kept up with the needs of aging infrastructure, there has
been some good news. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”),
enacted on November 15, 2021, authorized $550 billion in new
infrastructure spending over the subsequent five years.248 The IIJA
mandates new investment in infrastructure categories, including
transportation, broadband, electric grid and power, and water.249
“Transportation is one of the largest categories of investment and includes
spending on roads and bridges, public transit, and Amtrak.”250
242. Id.
243. The generational wealth gap between white and black Americans has been persistent
and led to additional challenges for black Americans during the pandemic. See, e.g.,
Christian E. Weller & Lily Roberts, Eliminating the Black-White Wealth Gap Is a
Generational Challenge, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.american
progress.org/article/eliminating-black-white-wealth-gap-generational-challenge/.
244. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 821, 834–41.
245. Id. at 821.
246. See EBP & AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
STATUS QUO INVESTMENT ACROSS INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 3 (2021), https://infrastructure
reportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/FTA_Econ_Impacts_Status_Quo.pdf.
247. LIDA R. WEINSTOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46826, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE
ECONOMY 3 (2021).
248. Id. at 14; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429
(2021).
249. WEINSTOCK, supra note 247, at 14.
250. Id.
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2. Climate Change Mitigation
The news continues to be dismal with respect to the U.S. response to
climate change. While President Biden re-committed the United States to
the Paris Agreement,251 congressional action on climate change looks
unlikely in the near future.252 At the same time, data continues to
accumulate showing that climate change will have dire effects on the
economy into the future, with a predicted $23 trillion cost to the world
economy by 2050.253 The BBB Act, passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives on November 19, 2021,254 would have provided for
refundable clean energy tax credits had it not died in the Senate.255 By
2031, these tax credits would have reduced power sector emissions to
below 2005 levels and increased the share of clean electricity generation
from 40% up to around 60%.256 In addition, BBB would have created an
investment tax credit for transmission lines to facilitate the increase of
renewable energy, as well as tax credits for electric vehicles and charging
infrastructure.257 In our 2020 article, we observed that carbon taxes, rather
than tax credits for renewable energy, would more efficiently encourage
sustainable energy use.258 We concluded, however, that “[i]nefficient
incentives might be better than no action at all given the urgency of climate
change and its economic impact on future generations.”259 Unfortunately, at
the time of this writing, it appears that we will have no action at all.

251. Elian Peltier & Somini Sengupta, U.S. Formally Rejoins the Paris Climate Accord,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/us-rejoins-parisclimate-accord.html.
252. See generally John Cassidy, Joe Manchin Kills the Build Back Better Bill, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/joe-manchinkills-the-build-back-better-bill.
253. Christopher Flavelle, Climate Change Could Cut World Economy by $23 Trillion in
2050, Insurance Giant Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
04/22/climate/climate-change-economy.html.
254. See supra note 137.
255. See Elise Gout et al., Congress Must Pass Build Back Better to Combat Climate
Change, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/
article/congress-must-pass-the-build-back-better-act-to-combat-climate-change/.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 838.
259. Id. at 839.
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3. Education
Future wellbeing closely correlates with education. In our 2020 article,
we wrote that “by encouraging education, tax systems can increase human
capital and thus promote economic growth.”260 The Social Security
Administration data shows that there are substantial differences in lifetime
earnings by educational achievement.261 Some research also shows that
college graduates are happier than those who did not attend college, but
opinions are mixed.262 On average, college graduates live longer. The
OECD found that, on average, a twenty-five-year-old man who has
completed college will live more than seven years longer than one who has
not completed college.263 For women, the life-expectancy gap for college
education is almost five years.264 As we noted in our 2020 article, “[T]ax
preferences can . . . be used to encourage individuals to obtain more
education.”265 The main tax benefits for higher education, available in 2021,
are the American Opportunity Tax Credit (“AOTC”)266 and the Lifetime
Learning Credit (“LLC”).267 The AOTC applies to the first four years of
college,268 while the LLC may apply to graduate education.269 When
Congress enacted the original tax credits for higher education in 1997, the
credits targeted middle-income taxpayers and phased out at relatively low
income levels.270 As we noted in our 2020 article, in 2015 Congress
doubled the threshold for phasing out the AOTC.271 We further noted that

260. Id. at 809.
261. See Research Summary: Education and Lifetime Earnings, OFF. OF RET. POL’Y, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/research-summaries/educationearnings.pdf (“Men with bachelor’s degrees earn approximately $900,000 more in median
lifetime earnings than high school graduates. Women with bachelor’s degrees earn $630,000
more. Men with graduate degrees earn $1.5 million more in median lifetime earnings than
high school graduates. Women with graduate degrees earn $1.1 million more.”).
262. Arthur C. Brooks, A College Degree Is No Guarantee of a Good Life, ATLANTIC
(July 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/07/will-going-collegemake-you-happier/613729/.
263. HOW’S LIFE? 2020, supra note 226, at 26.
264. Id.
265. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 840.
266. I.R.C. § 25A(b).
267. Id. § 25A(c).
268. Id. § 25A(b)(2)(C).
269. See id. § 25A(c)(2)(B).
270. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42561, THE AMERICAN
OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT: OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 2–3, 9 (2018).
271. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 840.
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[a]s a result, the American Opportunity Tax Credit is now more
heavily used by higher income households than ever before. As
children of higher income households were already more likely
to attend college than those from low-income households, the
2015 expansion probably did little to reduce inequality, and
many of the new tax benefits may have been wasted on higher
income students who would have attended college anyway.272
We recommended that Congress make the AOTC fully refundable to
encourage lower-income Americans to take advantage of the credit.273 That
has not happened, but the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021
doubled the phase-out threshold for the LLC, making it consistent with the
threshold for the AOTC.274 Following our prior analysis, this increase in the
threshold will not likely encourage lower-income individuals to pursue
higher education. In addition, the American Rescue Plan Act expanded the
exclusion of student loan forgiveness from gross income through 2025.275 It
seems likely that higher education will largely remain the purview of the
already privileged, which does not bode well for sustainable economic
justice.
IV. Conclusion
While longer than originally intended, this Article does not encompass
even a tithe of Professor Forman’s contributions to tax policy. His ideas
remain salient, even more so now than before the pandemic. While
pandemic legislation has temporarily adopted some of his
recommendations, and Congress has considered adopting more, we can
only hope that his vision continues to inform future policy makers. It would
truly make America a better nation and help to create prosperity for future
generations.

272. Id. at 840–41 (footnotes omitted); see also George B. Bulman & Caroline M.
Hoxby, The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education 30 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20833, 2015), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_
papers/w20833/w20833.pdf (concluding that the tax credits have little to no effect on college
attendance).
273. Forman & Mann, Borrowing from Millennials, supra note 3, at 841.
274. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41967, HIGHER EDUCATION
TAX BENEFITS: BRIEF OVERVIEW AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS 5 (2021).
275. In general, forgiven debt is included in gross income. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). Section
108 of the Internal Revenue Code provides an exclusion from gross income under certain
circumstances. Id. § 108(f) (excluding qualifying cancelled student loans debt).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/7

